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ABSTRACT 
This Article focuses on the federal Trademark Counterfeiting Act 
(TCA), the primary source of federal criminal trademark sanctions. That 
statute was intended to increase the penalties associated with the most 
egregious form of trademark infringement—use of an identical mark for 
goods identical to those for which the mark is registered and in a context 
in which the use is likely to deceive consumers about the actual source of 
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the counterfeiter’s goods. The TCA was intended to ratchet up the 
penalties associated with counterfeiting, but only in cases involving 
particularly egregious conduct. 
Several recent trends in the application of the TCA, however, suggest 
that doctrinal creep is afoot. Not only has Congress twice broadened the 
statute and increased the associated penalties, but courts also have played 
an active role in expanding the range of conduct that is subject to liability 
under the TCA. These trends are consistent with a number of parallel 
developments in and around intellectual property law in which provisions 
created on the promise of narrow application to the most serious 
violations have in fact been applied far more broadly than originally 
claimed. Collectively these developments suggest a strong tendency for 
this form of regulation (particularly the use of extreme, but supposedly 
narrowly-tailored, sanctions) to fail along the scope dimension. Indeed, 
that evolution is so common that one might think it is inevitable. This 
should give lawmakers real pause when considering these types of legal 
responses. To put it simply, if these provisions are initially justifiable only 
to the extent they are limited to the truly egregious cases, then their costs 
are likely to exceed their benefits over time because narrow application 
will not hold. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Trademark owners have long been able to enforce their rights 
through a federal cause of action against unauthorized uses of their 
marks.1 Private enforcement, however, is only part of the story. The 
federal government now also acts on behalf of mark owners, seizing 
infringing and counterfeit goods at the border and prosecuting 
counterfeiters under federal criminal law.2 The idea of criminal penalties 
for certain trademark violations is not new—indeed, Congress enacted 
criminal penalties as early as 1876, just a few years after it passed the very 
first federal trademark statute.3 But for most of the history of American 
trademark law, mark owners have had to be content with civil remedies, 
as Congress would not again enact criminal trademark penalties for more 
than 100 years after the Supreme Court struck down the 1876 Act in the 
1. The first federal trademark statute was passed in 1870. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16
Stat. 198. That Act, like each of the others passed before the Lanham Act in 1946, provided for a 
private cause of action only for infringement of registered trademarks.   
2. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e); 18 U.S.C. § 2320. 
3. Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141 (1846).
2
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Trade-Mark Cases.4 Thus, for all practical purposes, criminal trademark 
enforcement is a modern development, and one that has received 
relatively little scholarly attention.5 
This Article focuses on the federal Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 
1984 (TCA), the primary source of federal criminal trademark sanctions.6 
That statute was intended to increase the penalties associated with the 
most egregious form of trademark infringement—use of an identical mark 
for goods identical to those for which the mark is registered and in a 
context in which the use is likely to deceive consumers about the actual 
source of the counterfeiter’s goods.7 According to the legislative history, 
Congress felt these criminal penalties were necessary because civil 
damages were not sufficient to deter counterfeiters, who had come to 
regard civil liability as “the cost of doing business.”8 Indeed, “[t]he 
absence of [criminal] penalties, and the lack of sufficiently stiff civil 
sanctions, ha[d] emboldened counterfeiters, who now defraud consumers 
out of billions of dollars each year in the United States alone.”9 And 
increasing the damages available civilly was not enough by itself because 
the counterfeit goods could pose significant health and safety risks to 
4. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (declaring the 1870 and 1876 Acts
unconstitutional). 
5. There are a few exceptions. See, e.g., David J. Goldstone & Peter J. Toren, The 
Criminalization of Trademark Counterfeiting, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1998). Irina Manta has recently 
published several papers on criminal enforcement of intellectual property rights. See, e.g., Irina D. 
Manta, Intellectual Property and the Presumption of Innocence, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1745 
(2015); Irina D. Manta, The High Cost of Low Sanctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 157 (2014); Irina D. Manta, 
The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 469 
(2011). Those papers generally do not focus specifically on criminal trademark provisions, but they 
have in some cases discussed the Trademark Counterfeiting Act. See Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal 
Sanctions, supra, at 485-88.  
6. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2320 (1984)). A few other statutes, including the money laundering statute, also impose 
criminal liability for trademark counterfeiting under certain circumstances. See Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320104(b), 108 Stat. 1796, 2111 
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D) (2006 & Supp. III 2009)). Trademark counterfeiting is also a 
predicate offense to racketeering under the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996. See 
Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 3, 110 Stat. 1386, 1386 (1996).  
7. See 130 CONG. REC. 31,675 (1984). 
8. See S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 5 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, 3631
(“Although the Lanham Act provides for civil penalties for all forms of trademark infringement, 
including intentional trafficking in known counterfeits, penalties under that Act have been too small, 
and too infrequently imposed, to deter counterfeiting significantly. Indeed, many counterfeiters view 
potential civil penalties simply as the cost of doing their illegal business—a cost they can well afford, 
given the enormous profits to be made by capitalizing on the reputations, development costs, and 
advertising efforts of honest manufacturers at little expense to themselves.”).  
9. Id. at 1; see also id. at 4 (focusing on consumers “who pay for brand-name quality, and
take home only a fake”). 
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consumers, who have no cause of action under the Lanham Act.10 The 
TCA therefore was intended to ratchet up the penalties associated with 
counterfeiting. But parties would be exposed to this new criminal liability 
only when engaged in particularly egregious conductnot in ordinary 
cases of trademark infringement. 
Several recent trends in the application of the TCA, however, suggest 
that doctrinal creep is afoot. Congress has twice amended the statute to 
increase the penalties,11 and courts have in several ways expanded the 
range of conduct that is subject to liability under the TCA. Specifically, 
courts have accepted as relevant in the counterfeiting context 
controversial theories of civil infringement that are divorced from the 
most significant justifications of criminal liability, and they have 
interpreted specific provisions of the TCA in ways that undermine the 
limiting role those provisions were intended to play. 
These trends are consistent with a number of parallel developments 
in and around intellectual property law in which provisions created on the 
promise of narrow application to the most serious violations have in fact 
been applied far more broadly than originally claimed. Sometimes 
Congress has been to blame for those expansions—either because it has 
written grossly overbroad statutes that apply on their face to a much wider 
range of conduct than purportedly motivated the legal response, or 
because it has continually revisited statutes to broaden them and increase 
the penalties. Other times courts have been the primary culprits, as they 
have interpreted statutes in ways that flouted legislative intent. But 
whoever is primarily to blame, collectively these developments suggest a 
strong tendency for this form of regulation (particularly the use of 
extreme, but supposedly narrowly-tailored, penalties) to fail along the 
scope dimension. Indeed, that evolution is so common that one might 
think it is inevitable. This should give lawmakers real pause when 
considering these types of legal responses. To put it simply, if these 
provisions are initially justifiable only to the extent they are limited to the 
10. This is at least the claim made by Goldstone & Toren, supra note 5, at 13-15. Congress did 
cite health and safety concerns in the legislative history of the TCA, but it did not explicitly mention 
the lack of consumer standing under the Lanham Act. The Senate Report even gave a number of 
examples of faulty counterfeit goods that caused significant injuries, including counterfeit Boeing fire 
detection systems, counterfeit brake parts, and counterfeit heart pumps. S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 4.   
11. Congress enhanced the penalties in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. at 2148, and then again as part of the Anticounterfeiting 
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110 Stat. 1386 (1996). The ACPA also made 
counterfeiting a predicate offense to RICO. Id. § 3. The Prioritizing Resources and Organization for 
Intellectual Property Act of 2008 amended 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) to provide for treble damages and 
increase statutory damages in civil counterfeiting cases. Pub. L. 110-403, §§ 103-104, 122 Stat. 4256 
(2008). 
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truly egregious cases, then their costs are likely to exceed their benefits 
over time because narrow application will not hold. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three sections. Section II 
describes federal regulation of counterfeiting, focusing primarily on the 
TCA and comparing it to civil infringement and counterfeiting liability. 
Section III documents several ways in which courts have expanded the 
reach of the TCA, particularly by accepting post-sale confusion and 
liberally interpreting various parts of the statute. Section IV links these 
developments to similar trajectories in related contexts, and then more 
broadly to the expansion of federal criminal law. In light of those 
developments, it seems likely that greater expansion of the TCA is in 
store, and it suggests some ways of guarding against that expansion. 
II. FEDERAL TRADEMARK LAW
A. Infringement and Counterfeiting Provisions 
The Lanham Act broadly regulates in the trademark area, creating a 
mechanism for federal registration of marks and civil causes of action for 
infringement of both registered and unregistered marks.12 Courts 
developed most of the law of infringement, as the statutory provisions 
creating the causes of action are relatively sparse and the details they do 
contain are largely codifications of common law. Thus, while the statute 
makes clear that infringement entails a use in commerce that is likely to 
cause confusion,13 language about the types of confusion that are relevant 
can be found only in § 43(a), which deals with infringement of 
unregistered marks and other species of unfair competition.14 That more 
specific language was, it is widely acknowledged, added to the Lanham 
Act to codify case law that had expanded trademark law to cover cases of 
non-competing goods under the guise of “sponsorship or affiliation” 
confusion.15 
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052, 1114, 1125 (2012). 
13. Id. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A).
14. Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (making actionable uses in commerce that are “likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such 
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, 
or commercial activities by another person”). 
15. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 470-75 (1999)
(noting that, while Congress meant to expand the scope of actionable confusion beyond that of actual 
purchasers to include potential purchasers, it did not intend deletion of the phrase “as to the source of 
origin of goods” to be considered a substantive change); Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the 
Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 798-99 (2009) (characterizing Congress’s intent 
5
McKenna: Criminal Trademark Enforcement
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
994 AKRON LAW REVIEW [51:989 
The TCA added criminal penalties for what Congress regarded as a 
particularly egregious species of trademark infringement—the intentional 
trafficking in counterfeit goods.16 Under the statute, anyone who 
intentionally “traffics in goods or services and knowingly uses a 
counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or services” is guilty 
of a criminal violation.17 For purposes of the TCA, the term “counterfeit 
mark” means a “spurious mark”:18 
(i) that is used in connection with trafficking19 in any goods, services, 
labels, patches, stickers, wrappers, badges, emblems, medallions, 
charms, boxes, containers, cans, cases, hangtags, documentation, or 
packaging of any type or nature; 
(ii) that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a mark 
registered on the principal register in the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office and in use, whether or not the defendant knew such 
mark was so registered; 
(iii) that is applied to or used in connection with the goods or services 
for which the mark is registered with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, or is applied to or consists of a label, patch, sticker, 
wrapper, badge, emblem, medallion, charm, box, container, can, case, 
hangtag, documentation, or packaging of any type or nature that is 
designed, marketed, or otherwise intended to be used on or in connection 
with the goods or services for which the mark is registered in the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office; and 
(iv) the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to 
similarly); see also Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 
(2010) (criticizing the extent to which courts have expanded the notion of source confusion). 
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2320. According to the legislative history of the TCA, a “counterfeit mark is
the most egregious example of a mark that is ‘likely to cause confusion.’” 130 CONG. REC. H12076, 
H12078 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (Joint Explanatory Statement of Senate and House sponsors of 
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984). 
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(1). Largely in response to cases like United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 
1247 (10th Cir. 2000), which had held that it was not a violation to traffic in labels unattached to any 
goods, Congress amended the provision in 2006 to prohibit trafficking in labels and packaging 
themselves, and to expand the definition of trafficking to a wider range of activities. 18 U.S.C. § 
2320(a)(2), (f)(5). 
18. The statute does not define a “spurious mark,” but the limited case law on the issue suggests 
that “spurious” means “unauthorized” and can include genuine marks applied to goods that are not 
genuine.  
19. To “traffic” means “to transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to another, for purposes 
of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or to make, import, export, obtain control of, or 
possess, with intent to so transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of.” 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(5). 
6
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deceive . . . .20 
The current statute provides for fines of up to $2 million for an 
individual (up to $5 million for a person other than an individual) and 
imprisonment of up to ten years for a first violation.21 And these penalties 
are not just theoretical—courts have actually sentenced convicted 
counterfeiters to meaningful prison time in a number of recent cases.22 
The TCA also allows for an order of criminal forfeiture, destruction 
of the counterfeit goods, and restitution.23 The restitution provision in 
particular has been controversial of late because the government has been 
quite aggressive in its calculation of the amount of restitution owed. 
Specifically, the government has often argued that the amount of 
restitution should be based on the full retail value of the genuine goods, 
multiplied by the number of counterfeit goods, assuming that the 
counterfeit goods substitute for the genuine goods on a 1:1 basis.24 
Though empirical evidence makes clear that this assumption of 
substitutability has no basis in reality, the Sentencing Guidelines do not 
foreclose it because they speak in terms of the “amount of infringement,” 
and they allow the court to calculate that amount by reference to the value 
of the goods bearing the infringed mark rather than the infringing mark.25 
20. Id. § 2320(f)(1)(A). Section 2320(f)(1)(B) includes within the definition of “counterfeit
mark” a “spurious designation that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a 
designation as to which the remedies of the Lanham Act are made available by reason of section 
220506 of title 36,” the statutory provision dealing with use of terms relating to the Olympics.  
21. Id. § 2320(b). Penalties increase for second and subsequent offenses ((b)(1)(B)), where the 
counterfeiter knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury or death ((b)(2)), and where the 
counterfeiting involves military goods or services or counterfeit drugs ((b)(3)).  
22. See, e.g., United States v. Lam, No. 3:07-CR-374, 2011 WL 1167208, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 
28, 2011) (sentencing defendant to 11 months and 25 days in prison), aff’d, 677 F.3d 190 (4th Cir. 
2012).  
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(c). 
24. See, e.g., Victim Impact Statements, United States v. Manzo, No. CR-07-2042-WFN-2, 
2010 WL 3584499 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 8, 2010), rev’d, 675 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2012); cf. Jindeli 
Jewelry, Inc. v. United States, No. 14-cv-0314 (NG), 2016 WL 2593926, at *5-8 (E.D.N.Y. May 4, 
2016) (dismissing an APA challenge to the civil fines provision of 19 U.S.C. § 1526, which limits 
possible fines to “manufacturer’s suggested retail price for genuine merchandise,” in a case in which 
the defendant was fined for importing counterfeit “Chanel” jewelry and customs officials used the 
“closest authentic Chanel costume jewelry analogues” to set the fine, having determined that the 
counterfeits were not exact duplicates of any genuine Chanel pieces). 
25. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B5.3 cmt. n.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2016): 
2. Determination of Infringement Amount.—This note applies to the determination of the 
infringement amount for purposes of subsection (b)(1). 
(A) Use of Retail Value of Infringed Item.—The infringement amount is the retail 
value of the infringed item, multiplied by the number of infringing items, in a case 
involving any of the following: 
(i) The infringing item (I) is, or appears to a reasonably informed purchaser to 
7
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At the same time it enacted the TCA, Congress also amended the 
Lanham Act to provide for enhanced civil remedies for counterfeiting.26 
Specifically, the amended Lanham Act gives courts the power to grant ex 
parte seizure orders in cases in which the infringement “consists of using 
a counterfeit mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or 
distribution of goods or services.”27 Courts are now also instructed, unless 
they find “extenuating circumstances,” that they shall “enter judgment for 
three times such profits or damages, whichever amount is greater, together 
with a reasonable attorney’s fee” for intentional acts of counterfeiting.28 
And plaintiffs in civil counterfeiting cases may now elect to receive 
statutory damages of “not less than $1,000 or more than $200,000 per 
counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or 
distributed,” an amount that can be increased to $2 million per counterfeit 
mark per type of goods or services in cases in which courts deem the 
violation willful.29 
Section 34 defines a “counterfeit mark” for purposes of these special 
remedies to mean: 
[A] counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal register in 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods or 
services sold, offered for sale, or distributed and that is in use, whether 
or not the person against whom relief is sought knew such mark was so 
registered.”30 
be, identical or substantially equivalent to the infringed item; or (II) is a digital 
or electronic reproduction of the infringed item. 
(ii) The retail price of the infringing item is not less than 75% of the retail price 
of the infringed item. 
(iii) The retail value of the infringing item is difficult or impossible to 
determine without unduly complicating or prolonging the sentencing 
proceeding . . . . 
(v) The retail value of the infringed item provides a more accurate assessment 
of the pecuniary harm to the copyright or trademark owner than does the retail 
value of the infringing item. 
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116(d), 1117(c), (d). 
27. Id. § 1116(d)(1)(A) (allowing courts to grant orders to seize the “goods and counterfeit
marks involved in such violation and the means of making such marks, and records documenting the 
manufacture, sale, or receipt of things involved in such violation”). 
28. Id. § 1117(b). 
29. Id. § 1117(c). 
30. Id. § 1116(d)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Section 1116(d)(1)(B)(ii) makes the same
remedies available for use of “a spurious designation that is identical with, or substantially 
indistinguishable from, a designation as to which the remedies of this chapter are made available by 
reason of section 220506 of title 36,” which deals with the use of terms related to the Olympics. 
Despite its focus on the Olympic terms, the definition in subsection (ii) is otherwise identical to the 
8
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The Lanham Act defines a “counterfeit” generally as “a spurious mark 
which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a 
registered mark.”31 Thus, reading the general definition of “counterfeit” 
into § 34, the Lanham Act makes enhanced remedies available in cases 
involving essentially the same conduct as would trigger criminal liability 
under the TCA.32 
B. Narrow Tailoring of Criminal Counterfeiting 
Viewing the civil and criminal provisions together, federal statutory 
law provides for civil remedies for infringement of registered and 
unregistered trademarks. It provides for criminal liability and enhanced 
civil remedies for counterfeiting, which is a species of infringement of 
federally registered trademarks. The conduct subject to criminal liability 
under the TCA is somewhat more clearly defined, but piecing together 
various aspects of the relevant Lanham Act definitions, it seems the TCA 
criminalizes essentially the same conduct for which the Lanham Act 
provides enhanced civil remedies. Both § 34 of the Lanham Act and the 
TCA contain a number of important limitations that make the standard for 
counterfeiting substantially higher than for ordinary trademark 
infringement, and the TCA’s limitations in particular make criminal 
liability narrower than civil infringement liability. 
1. Intent and Registration Requirements
Most obviously, counterfeiting under the TCA requires intentionally 
trafficking in goods or services and knowingly using a counterfeit mark.33 
Thus, criminal liability should not attach to unintentional infringement or 
use of a mark with a good faith belief that the use is legitimate. Civil 
trademark infringement, by contrast, does not require intent, nor is good 
faith use of a mark exempt from liability.34 
TCA’s definition of a counterfeit mark. It is unclear whether that is supposed to imply that the 
definition of “counterfeit mark” in subsection (i) differs from that of the TCA in any substantive way.  
31.  15. U.S.C. § 1127. 
32. Specifically, in cases involving use of “a spurious mark which is identical with, or
substantially indistinguishable from,” a “mark that is registered on the principal register in the Unites 
States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed 
and that is in use, whether or not the person against whom relief is sought knew such mark was so 
registered.” Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d). 
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a). 
34. Lack of knowledge does limit remedies in some cases. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(b) 
(restricting the availability of profits or damages for applying a registered mark to labels, signs, prints, 
etc., without knowledge those items were intended to be used to cause confusion).  
9
McKenna: Criminal Trademark Enforcement
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
998 AKRON LAW REVIEW [51:989 
Moreover, to violate the TCA a defendant must use a counterfeit of 
a mark that is registered and in use by the mark owner.35 There are at least 
three interrelated ways this requirement makes counterfeiting liability 
narrower than civil infringement liability. First, counterfeiting requires 
use of a registered mark, whereas civil infringement claims are available 
under the Lanham Act for both registered and unregistered marks.36 
Second, and somewhat more subtly, the mark allegedly counterfeited 
must be both registered and in use—one cannot be guilty of counterfeiting 
for using a mark that is identical to a mark that is registered but which is 
not in use, or for using a mark that is in use but is not registered. And 
third, the alleged counterfeiter must be using the counterfeit mark for the 
goods and services specifically identified in the registration. 
Civil infringement liability of course requires that the plaintiff’s 
mark be in use, but it does not require that it be in use for precisely the 
goods identified in the registration, nor does it require that the defendant 
use the mark for goods or services identical to those for which the plaintiff 
uses the mark.37 A mark owner may enforce its rights against any use that 
might cause confusion, and courts in the modern era have made clear that 
non-competing uses can cause actionable confusion.38 Indeed, the 
multifactor likelihood of confusion test was developed specifically for the 
purpose of determining when a use infringes even though the defendant’s 
goods or services differ from the plaintiffs.39 
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(A)(ii) (“[A] spurious mark . . . is identical with, or substantially
indistinguishable from, a mark registered on the principal register in the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office and in use . . . .”). The defendant need not know that the mark is registered, 
however. Id.  
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Enhanced civil remedies for counterfeiting are, by their own
terms, limited to cases involving infringement of a registered mark. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116(d), 1117(c), 
(d). 
37. Civil counterfeiting liability, however, does require use of the counterfeit mark on the same 
goods or services for which the mark is registered. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B) (“‘[C]ounterfeit mark’ 
means a counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal register in the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office for such goods or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed and that is in 
use . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
38. See Pike v. Ruby Foo’s Den, Inc., 232 F.2d 683, 686 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (calling the
notion that there can be no unfair competition without competition “outmoded”); Aunt Jemima Mills 
Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1917) (finding that while “no one wanting syrup 
could possibly be made to take flour,” the products were “so related as to fall within the mischief 
which equity should prevent”). 
39. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (“Where the 
products are different, the prior owner’s chance of success is a function of many variables: the strength 
of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the 
likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s 
good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the 
buyers.”); see also Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward 
10
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Notably, setting aside enhanced civil remedies for counterfeiting, the 
goods and services identified in the registration take a back seat in civil 
infringement cases even in cases involving infringement of a registered 
mark. Rather than comparing the defendant’s goods to those recited in the 
registration, for likelihood of confusion purposes courts focus on the 
goods for which the plaintiff is actually using the mark, which they believe 
are more relevant to consumers’ potential confusion.40 One reason for 
courts’ focus on use rather than registration may be that, even when 
plaintiffs have registered their marks, they nearly always assert, in 
addition to infringement claims under § 32, § 43(a) unfair competition 
claims, for which registration is irrelevant. But whatever the reason, the 
TCA requires more than ordinary infringement; it requires identity 
between the defendant’s goods and those listed in a particular registration. 
Any variation between them ought to defeat a criminal counterfeiting 
claim. 
2. The Heightened Similarity Requirement
Criminal counterfeiting liability is also more limited than civil 
liability because of the level of similarity needed between the defendant’s 
mark and the allegedly counterfeited mark. Specifically, the TCA imposes 
criminal liability only when the defendant uses a mark that is “identical 
with, or substantially indistinguishable from” the registered mark.41 The 
statute does not define “substantially indistinguishable,” and there is some 
indication in the legislative history that Congress intended for courts to 
determine the meaning of that standard on a case-by-case basis.42 Yet 
while it seems clear that “substantially indistinguishable” was meant to 
a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307 (2012) (describing 
courts’ development of the multifactor likelihood of confusion test).  
40. See, e.g., Applied Info. Sciences Corp., v. eBay, Inc., 511 F.3d 966, 972 (9th Cir.
2007) (“Having established a protectable interest by proving it is the owner of a registered trademark, 
the owner does not additionally have to show that the defendant’s alleged confusing use involves 
the same goods or services listed in the registration.”). Courts do sometimes focus on the goods and 
services identified in the registration for purposes of determining whether the mark should enjoy a 
presumption of validity that is relevant to the case. But they also make clear that does not limit the 
scope of remedy. See 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 32:137 (4th ed. 2014) (“A contestable registration is prima facie evidence of the 
exclusive right to use only as to the goods specified in the registration. However, while 
the presumption of validity is limited, the remedies of the Lanham Act are not: they apply even though 
the infringing goods or services are not the same as those specified in the registration.”). 
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(1)(A)(ii). I claim no responsibility for the awkward “identical with” 
phrasing. 
42. See 130 CONG. REC. H12076, H12078, at 31,675 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (explaining that 
courts would have to provide the specific meaning of “substantially indistinguishable”). 
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prevent defendants from escaping liability by making merely “trivial” 
changes to the mark,43 it is also abundantly clear that Congress meant to 
require a much higher level of similarity for criminal counterfeiting 
liability than is necessary for a finding of civil infringement, for which 
mark similarity is only one factor to be considered in determining 
likelihood of confusion.44 The legislative history even gives an example: 
“Pristimol” might be used as the mark for a medication that is the 
functional equivalent of a product sold under the trademark “Mostimol.” 
Whether or not this sort of imitation violates the Lanham Act or other 
provisions of law, it does not constitute use of a “counterfeit mark” for 
purposes of the bill.45 
Describing the substantially indistinguishable standard, Congress 
also cited approvingly the Second Circuit’s pre-TCA decision in Montres 
Rolex, S.A. v. Snyder,46 in which the court interpreted the term 
“counterfeit” trademark for purposes of § 211 of the Customs Procedural 
Reform and Simplification Act of 1978.47 Montres Rolex endorsed an 
approach under which a defendant’s mark would qualify as counterfeit 
only when “the average buyer examining [goods] carrying the infringing 
mark would, if he or she were familiar with plaintiff’s mark, conclude that 
the infringing mark was in fact plaintiff’s mark.”48 
The Second Circuit explicitly distinguished this high standard from 
the lower one applicable in cases of ordinary infringement: 
[T]he customs laws and regulations create a two-tier classification 
scheme. The first category consists of marks which are merely 
infringements, judged by whether they are likely to cause the public to 
associate the copying mark with the recorded mark. In the second 
category are those marks which not only infringe but in addition are such 
close copies that they amount to counterfeits. The significance of this 
distinction emerges from the consequences that are attached to the two 
categories. Counterfeits are treated [more] harshly [than “merely 
43. See id. at 31,676 (making clear that the counterfeit mark need not be identical).
44. See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid, 287 
F.2d at 495. 
45. 130 CONG. REC. H12076, H12078, at 31,675. 
46. 718 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1983). 
47. Pub. L. No. 95-410, 92 Stat. 888, 903-04 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (Supp. V 1981)). 
That statute gave customs the authority to seize goods, and it expressly cross-referenced the Lanham 
Act to define the term “counterfeit mark.” And the Lanham Act at that time defined a “counterfeit 
mark” as “a spurious trademark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a 
registered trademark.” See Montres Rolex, 718 F.2d at 527. 
48. Montres Rolex, 718 F.2d at 527.
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infringing” articles].49 
To make clear exactly how high it believed this substantially 
indistinguishable standard was, the Montres Rolex court commented on 
three other Customs cases in which it thought the mark the defendant used, 
while likely infringing under the Lanham Act, could not properly have 
been considered a counterfeit. 
In the first of those cases, In re Louis Vuitton, “both the legitimate 
and the bogus merchandise bore marks comprised of two capital letters 
superimposed one upon the other, surrounded by a fleur-de-lis 
pattern”the legitimate merchandise bearing Louis Vuitton’s well-
known mark.50 Customs ruled in that case that “the use of a superimposed 
‘P’ rather than an ‘L’ over a ‘V’ created a substantial likelihood of 
customer confusion,” but the Second Circuit in Montres Rolex thought the 
accused mark was nevertheless not a counterfeit because it was “doubtful 
that the average purchaser would have viewed these marks as substantially 
indistinguishable.”51 
In the second case, In re Amazonas, the alleged counterfeiter used 
the name “Amazonas” as opposed to “Amazon” on shoe heels and soles.52 
Customs found that those two marks were similar enough to cause 
confusion, but the Second Circuit thought it was nevertheless clear that 
“Amazonas” was not a counterfeit mark because “it could not be seriously 
contended that the average consumer would have found [the marks] 
substantially indistinguishable.”53 
Finally, in In re Bulova Watch Co., the defendant used the name 
“Bolivia” as opposed to “Bulova” for watches.54 Customs found 
infringement, yet the Second Circuit deemed it “unlikely that an average 
purchaser would have found the marks on the two watches to be 
substantially indistinguishable.”55 “Bolivia” was not similar enough to 
“Bulova” to be considered a counterfeit mark, just as “Amazonas” was 
not similar enough to “Amazon” and a mark that consisted of a 
superimposed “P” over a “V” was not similar enough to the genuine mark 
with an “L” superimposed over a “V.” 
49. Id. at 528. 
50. Id. at 531 (citing In re Louis Vuitton, 14 Cust. B. & Dec. 878 (C.S.D. 80–97, Aug. 31,
1979)). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 531-32 (citing In re Amazonas, 14 Cust. B. & Dec. 787 (C.S.D. 80–39, July 17,
1979)). 
53. Id. at 532. 
54. Id. (citing In re Bulova Watch Co., 14 Cust. & B. Dec. 849 (C.S.D. 80–77, July 23, 1980)). 
55. Id. 
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All of those Customs cases, the Second Circuit believed, involved 
marks that were similar enough to the senior marks to be considered 
infringing as a civil matter, but they were not substantially 
indistinguishable from those senior marks. Montres Rolex therefore stands 
for the proposition that similarity that is sufficient to cause a likelihood of 
confusion is not enough for counterfeiting liability; substantially 
indistinguishable means something more than similarity sufficient to 
make confusion likely.56  
Montres Rolex also highlights a second crucial point: while the 
accused mark must meet the higher substantially indistinguishable 
threshold, meeting that standard is not sufficient because the defendant’s 
use must also be likely to cause confusion. The requirement that the 
allegedly counterfeit mark be identical with, or substantially 
indistinguishable from the genuine mark is an additional element of 
criminal counterfeiting beyond likelihood of confusion. There are, in 
other words, two distinct requirements for counterfeiting liability: (1) that 
the accused mark be identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from 
the registered mark; and (2) that the defendant’s use of the accused mark 
be likely to cause confusion. This should be obvious, since interpreting 
the statute to make dispositive proof that the spurious mark is substantially 
indistinguishable from the genuine mark would render superfluous the 
separate statutory requirement of proof of likelihood of confusion, 
violating ordinary canons of statutory construction.57 
In many cases, of course, the evidence on similarity and likelihood 
of confusion will overlap, since the level of similarity between the two 
marks will feature prominently in the determination of likely confusion. 
As the Montres Rolex court observed, in some cases, “the challenged 
mark, when viewed from the perspective of the average purchaser, would 
not be ‘likely to cause confusion’ unless it was ‘substantially 
indistinguishable’ from the registered mark.”58 But as the Customs cases 
make clear, “this will not always be so.”59  
One reason it will not always be so is that comparisons of the marks 
will have a different texture depending on the purpose of the comparison. 
To evaluate similarity for counterfeiting purposes, a decisionmaker must 
compare the registered mark and the allegedly counterfeit mark in 
56. Id. at 527.
57. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 669 (2007) (“[W]e 
have cautioned against reading a text in a way that makes part of it redundant.”); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 
U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (calling this the “rule against superfluities”).  
58. Id. at 531. 
59. Id.
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isolation, ignoring any additional context (such as other packaging 
elements or additional marks displayed on the defendant’s goods). 
Similarity analysis entails only a comparison of the marks themselves. 
When evaluating likelihood of confusion, however, a decisionmaker 
should never ignore the context in which consumers will encounter the 
marks because that context is clearly relevant to whether consumers are 
likely to be confused by the defendant’s use. Thus, both the heightened 
similarity requirement and the likelihood of confusion requirement play 
important roles in limiting the scope of criminal counterfeiting liability, 
and the fact that both are relevant to criminal liability further distinguishes 
counterfeiting from ordinary civil infringement. 
All of these limitations work together to make criminal 
counterfeiting liability substantially narrower than civil infringement 
liability. This is no accident—the TCA is supposed to target only the most 
extreme forms of trademark infringement, where the risk of trademark 
law’s core harm of passing off is at its greatest. But as the next sections 
demonstrate, appearances mislead here, as courts have often ignored the 
general understanding that criminal sanctions are meant to apply only in 
the most egregious cases and have undermined many of the specific 
statutory limitations. To make matters worse, the government has used a 
number of other statutory provisions to effectively criminalize conduct 
that cannot be reached under the counterfeiting provisions. 
III. COUNTERFEITING CREEP
Notwithstanding their repeated acknowledgment that the federal 
counterfeiting standards are supposed to be construed more narrowly in 
the criminal context,60 courts in fact have expanded the reach of the TCA 
in a number of ways. Some of these developments violate the general 
principle that criminal liability should be narrower than civil 
infringement; others eviscerate specific statutory limitations in the TCA. 
A. Embracing Controversial Expansion from the Civil Side 
First, far from limiting counterfeiting to the clearest and most 
egregious forms of infringement, courts have embraced some of the most 
controversial civil infringement doctrines. In a number of cases, courts 
have accepted that post-sale confusion satisfies the likelihood of 
60. See, e.g., United States v. Cone, 714 F.3d 197, 209 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he standard [for
liability] may be construed more narrowly in a criminal context than in a civil context.” (quoting 
United States v. Guerra, 293 F.3d 1279, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002))).  
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confusion requirement under the TCA. In United States v. Torkington, for 
example, the court said that the counterfeiting statute “is satisfied by a 
showing that it is likely that members of the public would be confused, 
mistaken or deceived should they encounter the allegedly counterfeit 
goods in a post-sale context.”61  
These cases, which often involve knock-off luxury goods, must rely 
on post-sale confusion because they arise in contexts in which no 
reasonable consumer would be confused at the point of sale. It is quite 
obvious to consumers who buy twenty-dollar Louis Vuitton handbags on 
Canal Street, for example, that the bags they are buying were not made by 
Louis Vuitton. Aside from the fact that they are being sold on Canal Street, 
their prices undoubtedly signal to consumers that the bags are not genuine. 
Nevertheless, courts repeatedly have found the TCA’s likelihood of 
confusion standard satisfied in cases in which the defendant was selling 
the allegedly counterfeit goods for a fraction of the price of the genuine 
goods, and even in cases in which the defendant told purchasers explicitly 
that the goods were not genuine.62 Post-sale confusion is sufficient, these 
courts argue, as “[n]othing in the plain meaning of the [TCA] restricts its 
scope to the use of marks that would be likely to cause direct purchasers 
of the goods to be confused, mistaken or deceived.”63  
As many have pointed out, one problem with the claim that post-sale 
confusion focuses simply on non-purchaser confusion is that, in reality, 
the cases in which post-sale confusion is claimed often involve no 
confusion of any kind at all.64 Indeed, courts have to make a number of 
significant inferential leaps to string together any narrative that involves 
61. 812 F.2d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir.1987); see also United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 808 (2d 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 132 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The statute’s application is 
not restricted to instances in which direct purchasers are confused or deceived by the 
counterfeit goods.”); United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1987). 
62. United States v. Song, 934 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding the conviction in a case in 
which the defendant sold counterfeit Gucci, Rolex, and Louis Vuitton goods for $35); Torkington, 
812 F.2d at 1350 (finding confusion despite the fact that the replica Rolex watches sold for $27); 
Gantos, 817 F.2d at 43 (upholding the conviction despite the fact that the defendant told the 
undercover agent that the counterfeit watches were copies); United States v. Infurnari, 647 F. Supp. 
57, 59 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (accepting that confusion of the general public would suffice for 
counterfeiting liability where the defendant told his customers that his watches were not actual Rolex 
or Piaget watches). 
63. Torkington, 812 F.2d at 1351; see also United States v. Foote, 413 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th
Cir. 2005). 
64. Cf. People v. Rosenthal, 800 N.Y.S.2d 354 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Mar. 4, 2003) (“There may
indeed be the occasional tourist who actually believes that he is buying a genuine Rolex for $20 from 
a man selling watches out of a briefcase in Battery Park. One can safely assume, however, that such 
naiveté is the exception rather than the rule.”). 
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confusion.65 They must assume that, even though the purchasers of fake 
Louis Vuitton bags on Canal Street are not confused, others will see the 
purchasers carrying around their imitation bags, believe the bags are 
genuine, observe some inferior quality about the bags, and attribute that 
inferior quality to Louis Vuitton. This will affect those observers’ view of 
the quality of genuine Louis Vuitton goods and thereby harm Louis 
Vuitton. These courts suggest not only that observers will make some 
assessment of the quality of handbags they see at a distance (despite not 
knowing anything about the age of those bags), but that those observers’ 
conclusions about the quality of the used handbags will affect their future 
purchasing behavior.66 Courts assume these effects even though they have 
no reliable information about observers’ future purchasing potential, and 
in spite of the likelihood that most purchasers of counterfeit goods would 
not, and probably could not, have purchased the genuine goods. 
The implausibility of courts’ inferential leaps is a clear indication 
that the post-sale confusion doctrine is nothing more than an attempt to 
dress up in confusion language protection that is really motivated by other 
concerns—particularly concerns about free-riding and loss of 
exclusivity.67 This is often apparent in decisions that have accepted the 
relevance of post-sale confusion in the counterfeiting context, as courts in 
those cases commonly emphasize that the counterfeiting provisions were 
meant primarily to protect mark owners rather than consumers. According 
to the Torkington court, for example: 
Like the Lanham Act, the Trademark Counterfeiting Act is not simply 
an anti-consumer fraud statute. Rather, a central policy goal of the Act 
is to protect trademark holders’ ability to use their marks to identify 
themselves to their customers and to link that identity to their reputations 
65. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1839, 1907-09 (2007) (“[T]he post-sale confusion doctrine, which makes actionable 
confusion of nonpurchasers based on their post-sale interaction with a product, requires rank 
speculation about viewers’ future purchasing intentions.”). 
66. For example, in Rolex Watch U.S.A v. Canner, a civil post-sale confusion case, the court
claimed that “[i]ndividuals examining the counterfeits, believing them to be genuine Rolex watches, 
might find themselves unimpressed with the quality of the item and consequently be inhibited from 
purchasing the real time piece.” 645 F. Supp. 484, 495 (S.D. Fla. 1986). Jeremy Sheff calls this a 
theory of “bystander confusion,” which allegedly arises when “a defendant sells its product to a non-
confused purchaser; observers who see the non-confused purchaser using the defendant’s [knockoff] 
product mistake it for the plaintiff’s [genuine] product; and those observers draw conclusions from 
their observations that influence their future purchasing decisions.” See Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen 
Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 773-74 (2012) (emphasis added). 
67. In Rolex Watch, the court quite honestly noted its concern that “[non-purchasers] who see 
the watches bearing the Rolex trademarks on so many wrists might find themselves discouraged from 
acquiring a genuine [Rolex] because the items have become too common place and no longer possess 
the prestige once associated with them.” 645 F. Supp. at 495. 
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for quality goods and services. 
It is essential to the Act’s ability to serve this goal that the likely to 
confuse standard be interpreted to include post-sale confusion. A 
trademark holder’s ability to use its mark to symbolize its reputation is 
harmed when potential purchasers of its goods see unauthentic goods 
and identify these goods with the trademark holder. This harm to 
trademark holders is no less serious when potential purchasers encounter 
these counterfeit goods in a post-sale context.68 
These decisions effectively read any meaningful likelihood of 
confusion requirement out of the counterfeiting statute on policy grounds. 
Sometimes, as in U.S. v. Hon, courts try to justify their acceptance of post-
sale confusion by claiming that is what Congress intended.69 That 
argument is superficially plausible, since some courts had already 
recognized post-sale confusion in the civil context by the time Congress 
passed the TCA.70 But the conclusion that post-sale confusion is relevant 
for purposes of the TCA is hardly inevitable, and there is precious little 
evidence of Congressional intent on the question.71 More importantly, as 
an empirical matter, there are serious questions about the harms to 
trademark owners in the post-sale context, particularly in cases involving 
luxury goods (which constitute the large majority of post-sale confusion 
cases). One study by Northwestern economist Yi Qian even suggests that, 
on balance, counterfeiting helps rather than hurts high-end brands.72 As 
Qian demonstrates, “counterfeits have both advertising effects for the 
68. Torkington, 812 F.2d at 1352-53 (internal citations omitted); see also United States v.
Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Section 2320(a) is not just designed for the protection of 
consumers. [It is] likewise fashioned for the protection of trademarks themselves and for the 
prevention of the cheapening and dilution of the genuine product.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
69. In U.S. v. Hon, for example, the court referred to the Senate Report on the TCA, which
cited the Second Circuit’s own previous observation in Montres Rolex that: “[C]ommercial 
counterfeiting ha[d] reached epidemic proportions . . . . The owners of trademarks on prestige items 
are particularly likely to be plagued by recurring counterfeit problems . . . [and] that the criminal 
counterfeiting act was designed to help stem this epidemic.” 904 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing S. REP. NO. 98-526, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, 3631). 
70. See, e.g., United States v. Infurnari, 647 F. Supp. 57, 59-60 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (“Congress 
did not have [a case in which the defendant told customers that its products were fake] in mind when 
it passed 18 U.S.C. § 2320. Nonetheless, Congress chose to use the same operative language in the 
criminal trademark act as in the Lanham Act. Both the Second and Ninth Circuits had already held 
that post-sale confusion was actionable when section 2320 was passed.”).  
71. The Senate Report cited by U.S. v. Hon, for example, does not mention anything about
prestige items, instead citing only the claim in Montres Rolex that counterfeiting had reached 
“epidemic proportions.” Hon, 904 F.2d at 806. 
72. See Yi Qian, Counterfeiters: Foes or Friends? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. w16785, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1759857 [https://perma.cc/W33R-YSS2]. 
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brand and substitution effects for authentic products. The advertising 
effect dominates substitution effect for high-end authentic product sales, 
and the substitution effect outweighs advertising effect for low-end 
product sales.”73 
Nor is it clear why we should care about any harm to mark owners 
in the post-sale context even if it were likely to result. As Jeremy Sheff 
argued persuasively, protection of prestige value via post-sale confusion 
doctrine comes at a cost—specifically, it preferences some consumers’ 
tastes for exclusivity (and producers’ ability to capture the value of that 
preference) over other consumers’ desire to use the marks for their own 
expressive purposes.74 It does so not to avoid deception in the market, but 
purely because of a normative choice to value some consumers’ 
preferences over others.75 As Sheff says, “[b]y establishing a system of 
licenses for social expression and enforcing those licenses with both 
monetary and injunctive remedies, the State is entering into an expressive 
alliance with one (powerful) segment of society, in opposition to the 
expressive interests of a different (weak) segment of society.”76 
Precisely because the harm-based justifications for post-sale 
confusion are so weak, the doctrine is quite controversial even in the civil 
infringement context. But even if post-sale confusion is now well 
established as a civil matter, we ought to be more reluctant to accept that 
doctrine in the criminal counterfeiting context. And yet the Second Circuit 
has explicitly rejected the argument that, because “Congress intended that 
the criminal act be narrower in scope than the Lanham Act and prohibit 
only ‘egregious’ instances of the conduct that the civil statute prohibits,” 
likelihood of confusion should be interpreted more narrowly in the context 
of the TCA.77 According to the Second Circuit, “egregiousness is 
grounded not upon whether the person deceived is a purchaser or potential 
purchaser but whether the mark is a counterfeit and is knowingly used as 
such.”78 
73. Id. (manuscript at 2). 
74. Sheff, supra note 66, at 821.
75. Cf. Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
809, 851-53 (2010) (referring to the post-sale confusion doctrine’s role in protecting rarity and 
distinction). 
76. Sheff, supra note 66, at 775.
77. United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 806-08 (2d Cir. 1990) (agreeing that criminal liability 
is supposed to be narrower, but rejecting the conclusion that post-sale confusion should therefore be 
irrelevant), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991). 
78. Id. This argument is, of course, largely conclusory: it does not help to say that
egregiousness relates only to the question of whether the mark is counterfeit and knowingly used as 
such when likelihood of confusion (and specifically the relevant type of confusion) is necessary to 
the determination of whether the defendant’s mark is, in fact, a counterfeit.   
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Perhaps courts’ acceptance of post-sale confusion in the 
counterfeiting context can’t be considered a surprise—after all, many 
people refer colloquially to knock-off luxury goods as “counterfeits,” and 
the legislative history of the TCA makes specific reference to a case about 
fake Rolex watches.79 Thus, maybe it is too hard to imagine that a 
counterfeiting statute would not reach imitation luxury goods, and post-
sale confusion is the only way to accomplish that end. In fact, to the extent 
most people think of imitation luxury goods when they speak of 
counterfeiting, it might even seem that the argument against criminalizing 
post-sale confusion is just an argument against criminal liability for 
counterfeiting. 
It is, however, worth noting that rejecting post-sale confusion would 
not render the TCA meaningless, as there are many counterfeit products—
including counterfeit drugs—that risk substantial point-of-sale confusion. 
And those counterfeit products are clearly the ones most likely to do harm, 
both to consumers and to mark owners. Indeed, neither of the two primary 
concerns identified by advocates for criminal counterfeiting penalties—
that consumers might be defrauded and that counterfeits pose health and 
safety risks—have much to do with post-sale confusion. Consumers 
generally are not buying counterfeit luxury goods under any illusion that 
they are genuine goods, so they are very unlikely to be defrauded. And 
it’s hard to imagine meaningful health or safety risks from handbags. 
Still, however one feels about courts’ acceptance of post-sale 
confusion in the criminal context, it is only one dimension of the judicial 
expansion of the TCA. Courts have also read down or undermined 
altogether a number of the TCA’s specific textual limits. 
B. Eviscerating Express Statutory Limits 
1. Watering Down the Similarity Requirement
Despite many courts’ citations of the Montres Rolex interpretation of 
the substantially indistinguishable standard (and their recognition that 
Congress referenced that standard in the legislative history of the TCA), 
courts have found defendants guilty of counterfeiting in cases in which 
the defendants used marks that clearly were not so similar to the registered 
marks that “the average buyer examining [the goods] would, if he or she 
were familiar with the [allegedly counterfeited] mark[s], [have] 
79. Montres Rolex, S.A. v. Snyder, 718 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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conclude[d] that the infringing mark[s] [were] in fact the [allegedly 
counterfeited] mark[s].”80 
One reason courts have reached these questionable results is that they 
have made the wrong comparisons. Specifically, courts have compared 
the mark used by the defendant to some combination of registered 
marks—in clear contravention of the statutory requirement that the 
allegedly counterfeit mark be identical with, or substantially 
indistinguishable from “a mark registered on the principal register in the 
United States Patent Office.”81 In U.S. v. Lam, for example, the Fourth 
Circuit found the defendants guilty of counterfeiting when the composite 
pattern of their goods used elements that were similar to two different 
registered trademarks, even though no single registration contained both 
elements.82 In that case, the defendants sold handbags with a composite 
pattern that consisted of a plaid pattern with an equestrian knight 
superimposed over it. 
80. Id. at 527. 
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (emphasis added). 
82. United States v. Lam, 677 F.3d 190 (4th Cir. 2012). Full disclosure: I served as an expert
witness for the defendants in U.S. v. Lam. My testimony focused on precisely this question—whether 
the defendants’ marks were “identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from” a registered mark. 
In my view, they were not.  
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Burberry owned a federal registration of a plaid pattern,83 which the 
Fourth Circuit believed was similar to the one used by the defendants, and 
it owned several other federal registrations for an equestrian knight 
device. But importantly, Burberry did not own a single registration for any 
mark consisting of both components. 
According to the Fourth Circuit, the defendants’ pattern “consisted 
of a plaid pattern similar to the Burberry Check mark with an equestrian 
knight superimposed over it.”84 Having noted that the defendants’ 
products were very similar to Burberry’s commercial products, on which 
Burberry often used both marks,85 the court affirmed the district court’s 
finding that the pattern was substantially indistinguishable from 
Burberry’s registered plaid pattern.86 The court found it relevant in 
assessing similarity that “although the Burberry Check mark d[id] not 
include an equestrian knight, it [was] undisputed that Burberry ha[d] 
obtained trademark protection for an equestrian knight mark, and that it 
often [sold] handbags and other goods displaying a combination of the 
two marks.”87 
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis wrongly aggregated multiple 
registered marks for purposes of the comparison with the defendants’ 
design. But the flipside of that aggregation—the court’s dissection of the 
defendants’ aggregate design to compare one part of it to the Burberry 
plaid pattern—was just as problematic. As the Fourth Circuit noted, 
83. Burberry actually owns several registrations of slightly different plaid patterns, but the
government alleged that the defendants’ bags were counterfeits of one plaid pattern in particular.  
84. Lam, 677 F.3d at 195. 
85. Id. at 199 (“[T]he marks are similar enough to allow a reasonable jury to [find them
substantially indistinguishable]—especially in light of the evidence demonstrating that Burberry often 
sells goods displaying the Burberry Check mark and the Burberry Equestrian mark together.”).  
86. Notably, the jury “did not find the knight displayed on these goods to be a counterfeit of
the Burberry Equestrian mark. Trial testimony indicates that it differed from the Burberry Equestrian 
mark in several respects.” Id. at 195 n.6.  
87. Id. at 200.
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during its deliberations the jury asked the district court judge whether it 
should consider the presence of the defendants’ knight device when 
comparing the defendants’ plaid pattern to the registered Burberry plaid 
pattern.88 In response, the district court judge essentially told the jury that 
it had the discretion to decide whether to consider the knight device or 
not.89 This was a clear legal error. 
Unlike the ultimate factual question of whether two marks are, in 
fact, substantially indistinguishable, the question of which marks should 
be compared is a legal question answered definitively by the statute. It 
therefore was not up to the jury to decide whether to consider the 
defendants’ knight device; the statute required a comparison of the 
defendants’ mark to a particular registered trademark. Perhaps the jury 
would have found the pattern on the bags substantially indistinguishable 
from Burberry’s check pattern even if it considered the knight device, 
though the fact that it asked the district court judge implies that at least 
some jurors considered the differences significant. But the point is that the 
court should have forced the jury to make precisely that finding. 
Indeed, to allow the jury to ignore the defendants’ knight device was 
to invite it to compare a part of the defendants’ mark to the allegedly 
counterfeited registered mark, a comparison that would flout the anti-
dissection rule, one of trademark law’s most well-established principles. 
As courts have long recognized in the civil context, trademarks must be 
compared as a whole when assessing similarity as part of the likelihood 
of confusion analysis; the marks should not be dissected into their 
constituent parts because the commercial impressions of the marks as a 
whole are what matter.90 When confronted with that argument, the Fourth 
88. Id. at 196 (“[W]hen comparing the [defendants’] plaid on the purses seized in Norfolk to
the [Burberry Check mark], should we consider the presence of the Marco knight?” (quoting a 
question submitted by the jury)). 
89. See id. (“On the one hand, the defendants presented evidence and argued that you accept
as a fact that the plaid plus the Marco knight is a composite mark that should be compared as a 
composite mark with the [Burberry Check mark]. On the other hand, the government has put on 
evidence and argued that the plaid pattern alone on the alleged counterfeit bag is violative, meaning 
substantially indistinguishable, from the [Burberry Check mark]. Depending on the way you find 
facts, you may consider the Marco knight in comparing the marks. That’s not the province of the 
court, it’s the province of the jury. Of course, the defendants also contend that the plaid by itself is 
not substantially indistinguishable and therefore not counterfeit.”).   
90. AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 795 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the
defendant’s argument that the court should ignore parts of the parties’ respective marks when 
evaluating the similarity of the marks as part of the likelihood of confusion analysis, noting that doing 
so would require the court to violate the “anti-dissection rule,” according to which courts “view marks 
in their entirety and focus on their overall impressions, not individual features” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 23:41 (collecting cases applying the anti-
dissection rule).   
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Circuit mangled the doctrine badly, claimingincorrectlythat the anti-
dissection rule applied only in the registration context, and that it served 
the limited function of determining whether composite marks are 
registrable even when they contain some descriptive (and therefore 
registrable) matter.91 Because the court so misunderstood the anti-
dissection rule, it focused solely on Burberry’s mark and not the 
defendants’, missing the point of anti-dissection.92 
In light of the Fourth Circuit’s decision, dissection may well be 
legitimate in counterfeiting cases; a defendant’s mark may be considered 
a counterfeit if a part of that mark is sufficiently similar to the registered 
mark, even if other parts of the defendant’s mark clearly differentiate it 
from the registered mark. The alternative way of looking at the Fourth 
Circuit’s approach—that the court allowed the jury to define the 
defendants’ mark for purposes of comparison to the registered mark—is 
no better. Nor is the possibility that courts can aggregate elements of 
multiple marks to compare to the defendant’s composite design. 
To see why this kind of thinking could prove enormously 
problematic, consider a case pursued at the state level by a prosecutor in 
Massachusetts.93 In that case the defendant was arrested and charged with 
counterfeiting under a Massachusetts statute94 for selling t-shirts that 
depicted the Vancouver Canucks hockey team’s registered logo (left) 
overlaid with a large red opaque universal “NO” symbol (a circle with a 
line through it) (right).95 
91. Lam, 677 F.3d at 198 n.7 (“A composite mark is one that contains some matter that is
descriptive in nature—and, thus, would not alone be registerable as a trademark—used in conjunction 
with nondescriptive matter.”). The court got this idea from a 1920 registration decision, which of 
course defined the anti-dissection rule in this way, since registration was the only issue in that case. 
But clearly that is not the only context in which the anti-dissection rule applies.  
92. Id. (“It is unclear whether this rule applies to the Burberry Check mark, as it is not a
composite.”). Of course, the court seemed to have forgotten that the registered check pattern was not 
a composite when it came time to consider the relevance of the separately-registered equestrian knight 
device. 
93. See Andy Sellars, DMLP Amicus Update: Narrow Victory in Massachusetts Anti-
Counterfeiting Case, DIG. MEDIA LAW PROJECT (June 21, 2012), http://www.dmlp.org/
blog/2012/dmlp-amicus-update-narrow-victory-massachusetts-anti-counterfeiting-case 
[https://perma.cc/3MDY-MUTB].  
94. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 147.
95. Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Commonwealth v. Busa, No.
1101CR005277 (May 14, 2012), http://www.dmlp.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/
Busa%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZ5W-H83Y]. The defendant also was 
charged with counterfeiting for selling t-shirts that read “Boston Fights Vancouver Bites.”   
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According to the state, the t-shirts reproduced recognized logos, and 
the addition of the “NO” symbol made no difference—the relevant 
comparison was between the allegedly counterfeited logo and a part of the 
design on the front of the defendant’s t-shirts. That approach allowed the 
state to ignore the quite obvious differences between the images, which 
eliminated any risk that a consumer would buy one of those t-shirts 
believing it came from the Vancouver Canucks (indeed, no reasonable 
person could possibly miss the critical message). 
The Massachusetts case ultimately was dismissed, and obviously it 
was not brought under the TCA.96 But under the Fourth Circuit’s 
reasoning in U.S. v. Lam, a jury could plausibly have found that the 
defendant’s mark (if it can even be called that) was identical with, or 
substantially indistinguishable from the registered Vancouver Canucks 
mark. The t-shirts contained a replica of that mark, and since there is no 
rule against dissection, the jury could base its comparison only on that 
element of the defendant’s mark, ignoring the “NO” symbol. That absurd 
result is clearly inconsistent with the purposes of the TCA. 
These kinds of mistakes are to some extent a byproduct of the fact 
that courts are applying, in cases that involve the design of goods 
themselves, a counterfeiting statute that contemplates trademarks used in 
conjunction with, but clearly separate from, the goods. When the allegedly 
counterfeited mark is a design feature of the defendant’s goods, courts 
seem more willing to dissect the defendant’s design and focus on portions 
96. Indeed, the definition of “counterfeit mark” under the Massachusetts statute is
breathtakingly broad. A counterfeit mark is “any unauthorized reproduction or copy of intellectual 
property, or intellectual property affixed to any item knowingly sold, offered for sale, manufactured 
or distributed, or identifying services offered or rendered, without the authority of the owner of the 
intellectual property.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 147(a). “Intellectual property” is then defined as: 
“[A]ny trademark, service mark, trade name, label, term, device, design or word that is (1) adopted 
or used by a person to identify such person’s goods or services, and (2) registered, filed or recorded 
under the laws of the commonwealth or of any other state, or registered in the principal register of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office.” Id.  
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of the design. This is dangerous territory, as it is only a short step from 
applying counterfeiting law to marks or logos incorporated on to goods 
(of which there are many examples) to applying it to the configuration of 
goods themselves. 
To my knowledge, this subtle move has not yet happened in a federal 
counterfeiting case. But it has at the state level. The Supreme Court of 
Indiana reversed the trial court’s dismissal of counterfeiting charges under 
an Indiana statute against defendants who sold “airsoft guns,” described 
by the court as “toy replicas of real guns that shoot lightweight plastic 
pellets instead of metal BBs or live ammunition.”97 The court found that 
replicating the design of another company’s real guns could constitute 
“mak[ing] or utter[ing] a written instrument in such a manner that it 
purports to have been made by authority of one who did not give 
authority,”98 accepting that a toy gun could be considered a “written 
instrument” for purposes of the statute. 
Remarkably, the court even held that making toy replica guns could 
constitute theft, because making the replicas “exerted control” over “the 
property of another”—namely over the trademark (the product 
configuration) of the manufacturer of the real guns copied by the 
defendant.99 To put it simply, the Indiana Supreme Court turned a huge 
number of garden variety trade dress infringement claims into criminal 
offenses. 
It would be worrisome if this trend were to spill over to cases under 
the TCA, particularly since it’s unclear how several of trade dress law’s 
various limiting doctrines apply in the counterfeiting context. Because 
courts generally have not dealt with counterfeiting cases involving 
product configuration, for example, they have had no occasion to apply 
functionality doctrine in this context.100 And yet concerns about 
undermining patent law’s policy choices and/or imposing significant non-
reputation-related disadvantages should be even more significant in the 
criminal context. 
97. Yao v. State, 975 N.E.2d 1273, 1275 n.1 (Ind. 2012). 
98. Id. at 1278. The Indiana statute is IND. CODE § 35-43-5-2.
99. Yao, 975 N.E.2d at 1277. Theft is criminalized under IND. CODE § 35-43-4-2, which
provides that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally exerts control over property of another 
person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use, commits theft, a Class 
D felony.” 
 100.  See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (“In general 
terms a product feature is functional, and cannot serve as a trademark, if it is essential to the use or 
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 4, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss4/1
2017] CRIMINAL TRADEMARK ENFORCEMENT 1015 
Some recent cases in the Customs context highlight the concern. In 
a series of enforcement actions, Customs has seized imported replacement 
automobile parts on the ground that the parts (usually front grilles) are 
counterfeits because they copy registered marks in the grille designs.101 
The problem is that the grille designs are often necessary in the context of 
a replacement part—in the sense that car owners want parts that restore 
their cars to their original design, and sometimes even in the sense that the 
parts must have a particular design in order to fit the vehicle. Those 
concerns ordinarily would be voiced in functionality terms in the civil 
litigation context. 
In that context, the functionality argument would be straightforward. 
Whatever the status of the grille designs when used for vehicles as a 
whole, or even for toys designed to mimic the design of real vehicles,102 
the designs reflected in the registrations identified in the seizure orders are 
functional in the context of aftermarket automobile parts because the 
constraints are significantly greater there. Owners of particular models 
seek replacement parts that will return their vehicles to their original 
designs. Only replacement parts with the original design can fulfill that 
purpose. Moreover, auto body shops and repair shops are the primary 
purchasers of replacement parts, and those shops typically purchase the 
parts at the behest of insurance companies, which are typically required 
by the terms of their contracts with their insureds to purchase parts of “like 
kind and quality” to the OEM parts. Indeed, a number of jurisdictions 
legally obligate insurers to base their estimates on replacement parts that 
equal or exceed comparable OEM replacement parts in terms of fit, form, 
finish, quality, and performance.103 Given these constraints, designs that 
match OEM parts are clearly essential to the use or purpose of the 
replacement parts. No other design will do. 
Exclusive use of the designs would also put aftermarket producers at 
a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage. Indeed, inability to use 
 101.  See, e.g., U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, Notice of Seizure, Case No. 2017-
1703-000147-01 (June 6, 2017) (on file with author). The Tariff Act prohibits importation of goods 
bearing a counterfeit trademark that is registered with the Patent and Trademark Office and registered 
with Customs and Border Patrol. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (2012). The Act defines “counterfeit trademark” 
by reference to the Lanham Act counterfeiting provision, which defines a “counterfeit” mark as “a 
spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1127.   
 102.  See General Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 415 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding 
nonfunctional “the exterior appearance and styling of the [Hummer] vehicle design which includes 
the grille, slanted and raised hood, split windshield, rectangular doors, [and] squared edges” when 
trade dress was asserted against a toy vehicle designed to mimic the Hummer).   
 103.  See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 216.7(b)(5) (2016) (“Standards for 
prompt, fair and equitable settlement of motor vehicle physical damage claims.”). 
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precisely these designs would effectively eliminate competition in the 
market for replacement parts. Thus, the grille designs are also 
aesthetically functional.104 The markets for replacement parts are 
extremely narrow because they are defined by the car models to which 
particular part numbers correspond. The parts are generally not 
interchangeable across multiple vehicle models, and alternative grille 
designs are not remotely adequate substitutes. Owners of particular 
models seek replacement parts that will return their vehicles to their 
original designs, so giving OEMs exclusive rights to produce grilles of a 
particular design would put aftermarket part producers like LKQ at a 
significant—indeed decisive—competitive disadvantage. 
Those arguments should cut even more powerfully against treating 
the grille designs as counterfeits, regardless of the context. And they 
might well prevail. But the point is that there is virtually no law dealing 
with functionality in any counterfeiting context, because courts have not 
addressed counterfeiting of product configuration, even if cases like Lam 
are beginning to blur the lines here. 
Relatedly, courts in civil product configuration cases have gone to 
great lengths to require claimants to describe their trade dress with some 
particularity.105 They have done so in order to guard against ad hoc and 
opportunistic trade dress claiming and to prevent parties from asserting 
rights in unprotectable elements.106 That trend does not seem to have 
reached counterfeiting cases, probably because opportunistic claiming 
should be less of an issue in that context in light of the TCA’s requirement 
that the alleged counterfeiter use a registered mark. Any registration of a 
configuration would necessarily depict and describe the claimed 
configuration.107 But courts undermine certainty about the features of the 
 104.  See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33 (“It is proper to inquire into a ‘significant non-reputation-
related disadvantage’ in cases of esthetic [sic] functionality . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).  
 105.  See, e.g., General Motors, 468 F.3d at 415 (“In requiring a list of discrete elements, we are 
looking to avoid vague and indeterminate references to the overall appearance or look of plaintiff’s 
packaging.”); Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 768 (6th Cir. 2005) (“To recover for trade-
dress infringement under . . . the Lanham Act, a party must first identify what particular elements or 
attributes comprise the protectable trade dress.”). 
 106.  The requirement of a written description is not just applicable to product configuration 
cases, see Star Indus. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F. 3d 373 (2d Cir. 2005), but courts have been more 
insistent on descriptions in those cases. See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, 
Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 634 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hatever may be claimed as the combination of elements 
making up the product or its packaging and presentation, [i]t will not do to solely identify in litigation 
a combination as ‘the trade dress.’ Rather, the discrete elements which make up that combination 
should be separated out and identified in a list.” (quoting 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 8:3)). 
 107.  Of course, the Trademark Office only inconsistently applies its rules regarding verbal 
description of the mark. See Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, Claiming Design, 167 U. PENN. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).  
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claimed mark to the extent they allow dissection and comparison of 
particular elements of the marks, making articulation of the elements more 
important. 
Dissection also increases the risk that the similarity assessment will 
be dominated by unprotectable elements. Where courts strictly interpret 
the requirement that the allegedly counterfeit mark be identical with, or 
substantially indistinguishable from the registered mark, and when that 
comparison must take into account all of the features of the registered 
mark, there is less reason for concern about the protectability of individual 
features. When courts allow dissection without accounting for 
individually protectable features, they run the risk of expanding the scope 
of the registered mark, which should be of particular concern in the 
counterfeiting context.108 
2. Errors in Likelihood of Confusion
In addition to the various ways courts have undermined particular 
statutory limits in the TCA, they have sometimes assessed likelihood of 
confusion inappropriately. Specifically, courts have compared products 
side-by-side, devoid of any context, and sometimes even have credited 
expert testimony or given weight to defense witnesses’ inability to 
distinguish counterfeit and genuine items.109 These errors in evaluating 
likelihood of confusion reflect courts’ conflation of the similarity question 
(whether the defendant’s mark is identical with, or substantially 
indistinguishable from the genuine mark) and the separate likelihood of 
confusion question. Side-by-side comparison is appropriate for assessing 
similarity, but importantly, the statute clearly requires comparison of the 
defendant’s mark and the registered mark of which it is allegedly a 
counterfeit. Side-by-side comparison of products is not appropriate, and 
that is important because the registered mark may well not give the same 
commercial impression when it is used in context. Indeed, comparing 
products side-by-side in a trademark case is analogous to comparing the 
defendant’s product to the commercial embodiment of the plaintiff’s 
design in a design patent case, rather than comparing the accused design 
to the patent drawings, as is required.110 
 108.  As Mark Lemley and I demonstrated, this is a pervasive problem in trademark infringement 
litigation. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2243-59 
(2016). 
 109.  See, e.g., United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 
(1989); Rolex Watch USA, Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 489 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
 110.  See Sun Hill Indus., Inc. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 48 F.3d 1193, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(noting that comparing the accused device to the plaintiff’s commercial embodiment is improper 
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Finally, even if the statute allowed courts to compare products rather 
than marks, side-by-side comparison would still be problematic at the 
likelihood of confusion stage of counterfeiting cases because consumers 
typically do not encounter counterfeit products alongside genuine goods 
in the marketplace. As the Second Circuit said in Louis Vuitton Malletier 
v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., “the Lanham Act requires
a court to analyze the similarity of the products in light of the way in which 
the marks are actually displayed in their purchasing context.”111 And for 
that reason, “[w]hether simultaneous viewing by consumers is likely to 
result in confusion is not relevant when it is serial viewing that is at issue 
given the market context or the type of confusion claimed.”112 
IV. OTHER DOCTRINAL EXPANSIONS
It might be possible to write off these developments in criminal 
trademark law if they were isolated examples. After all, courts do 
sometimes hold the line on counterfeiting liability and refuse to impose 
criminal sanctions in cases in which the defendant’s conduct clearly meets 
the civil infringement standard. 
But courts’ expansions of counterfeiting liability are of a piece with 
a number of other developments in intellectual property law and other 
adjacent areas of law. In each of these areas, Congress has provided for 
substantially increased civil remedies or criminal penalties and has 
justified those sanctions on the ground they would apply only in cases of 
egregious misconduct. Yet those supposedly narrowly-targeted sanctions 
have routinely been applied far outside the contexts used to justify them. 
As a result, in some cases courts have imposed criminal penalties on 
except when there is “no significant distinction in design . . . between the patent drawing and its 
physical embodiment”). 
111.  426 F.3d 532, 538 (2d Cir. 2005).  
 112.  Id.; see also AM General Corp. v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 825 (7th Cir. 
2002) (“Limiting the focus to the grille and ignoring all that surrounds the grille seems to blink the 
general rule that courts evaluate similarity in light of what happens in the marketplace, rather than 
just by making a side-by-side comparison.”); Fun–Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 
F.3d 993, 1004 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he test of confusion [under the Lanham Act] is not whether the 
products can be differentiated when [they] are subject to a side-by-side comparison. Instead, we must 
ask whether they create the same general overall impression such that a consumer who has seen 
[plaintiff’s] trade dress would, upon later seeing [defendant’s] trade dress alone, be 
confused.”); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson Chem. Co., 589 F.2d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 
1978) (“The test [for likelihood of confusion] is not whether the consumer will know the difference 
if he sees the competing products on the same shelf.”); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 23:59 (“A 
side-by-side comparison of the conflicting marks is improper if that is not the way buyers see the 
products in the market.”). 
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conduct that does not even clearly constitute civil infringement under 
standard interpretations of intellectual property provisions. 
The federal government, for example, has for several years claimed 
authority (prior to and independent of the controversial SOPA and PIPA 
bills) to seize domain names and make their content disappear without 
notice or a hearing. Indeed, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
has seized hundreds of domain names, at least.113 To the extent it has 
articulated the authority under which it has done so, the government has 
most often pointed to the PRO-IP Act, which amended 18 U.S.C. § 2323 
to make civil forfeiture rules applicable to various forms of intellectual 
property.114 
Sometimes the government has eventually gotten around to 
instituting actions under civil forfeiture laws, even if well after seizing the 
domain names. But in a number of cases, ICE has simply held the domain 
names without filing charges.115 Many of those seizures, it now seems 
clear, were carried out at the direction of private content owners. Indeed, 
ICE even announced one set of seizures “on a Burbank soundstage (Walt 
Disney Studios) flanked by members of the Motion Picture Association 
of America.”116 
Private parties also have been able to persuade courts to issue 
injunctions (frequently on an ex parte basis) that include orders to non-
party registries, registrars, and/or search engines to prevent domain names 
from connecting to corresponding websites or to cease facilitating access 
to any websites through which defendants conduct business.117 It is 
 113.  Tamlin H. Bason, ICE, DOJ Seize 150 Domain Names In Advance of Cyber Monday 
Shopping, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.bna.com/ice-doj-seize-n12884904587/ 
[https://perma.cc/4D6D-NR7J].  
 114.  Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-
403, § 206, 122 Stat. 4262 (2008). 
 115.  In one case, the website owner sued to get back the domain name rojadirecta.com, a site 
that streamed Spanish league soccer games (which was perfectly legal in Spain). Puerto 80 Project’s 
Petition for Release of Seized Property, Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11 Civ. 3983 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). The district court denied that seizure of the domain name constituted a “substantial 
hardship” under 18 U.S.C. § 983, a ruling the web site owner appealed. Not having received a decision 
from the Second Circuit more than a year after the seizure, the government voluntarily withdrew its 
forfeiture complaint, mooting the website owner’s case. Letter from Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney, to 
the Honorable Paul A. Crotty, District Judge, S.D.N.Y. (Aug. 29, 2012), 
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2012/08/8.29.12-cover-letter-to-Judge-Crotty.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VXX8-K5K5].  
 116.  John Eggerton, ICE Seizes Domains, Assets of Alleged TV, Movie Pirates, BROADCASTING 
& CABLE (June 30, 2010), https://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/technology/ice-seizes-domains-
assets-alleged-tv-movie-pirates/47602 [https://perma.cc/BYP5-TPFM].  
 117.  411 Mania.com, LLC v. Doe, 1:17-CV-00469 (LMB/IDD), 2017 WL 4052374, at *2 (E.D. 
Va. Sept. 12, 2017) (ordering a non-party domain name register to “immediately transfer the 
Infringing Domain Name to plaintiff”); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Aaabagswear.com, 17-CV-61147, 2017 
31
McKenna: Criminal Trademark Enforcement
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
1020 AKRON LAW REVIEW [51:989 
entirely unclear how courts have the authority to order nonparties to take 
these steps, but that does not seem to have given any of these courts pause. 
It would be one thing if these seizures or the injunctions entered by 
courts in cases of private enforcement really were limited to the most 
egregious cases—those involving only “rogue” sites “dedicated to theft of 
U.S. Property.”118 But often they have not been. In one case involving the 
domain name Dajaz1.com, for example, the government seized the 
domain name and held if for over a year, well beyond the time period in 
which it should have had to return the domain name or file a forfeiture 
proceeding. Documents later unsealed revealed that the government had 
seized the domain name without any real evidence and had filed ex parte 
requests to extend the time to file the forfeiture proceeding because it was 
waiting for copyright ownersparticularly the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA)to investigate.119 Apparently the 
investigation turned up nothing illegal, and the domain name was returned 
to its owners without any charges being filed.120 To summarize, the 
WL 6949255, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 21, 2017) (ordering non-party domain name registers to assist in 
changing the registrar of record for the infringing domain name to a holding account with a registrar 
of the plaintiff’s choosing); Belstaff Group SA v. Doe, 15-CV-2242(PKC)(MHD), 2015 WL 
10852520, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2015) (permanently enjoining any third party vendor that received 
actual notice of the order—including domain name registers, search engines, and payment 
processors—from providing services used in connection with the defendant’s infringing domain 
names); Temporary Restraining Order, at 8-9, Richemont Int’l v. Montesol OU, No. 11-CV-9322 
(JGK)(HBP), 2014 WL 3732887 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2014) (“[A]ny websites, online search engines, 
online shopping price comparison services, or any other business or publication that advertises 
Defendants’ websites associated with the Subject Domain names . . . temporarily restrained and 
enjoined from advertising, promoting, or marketing Defendants’ Counterfeit Products or Defendants’ 
Websites . . . [and] from supporting or hosting Defendants’ Websites.”); Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. 
Liyanghua, No. 11-CV-7970, 2011 WL 7095800 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2011) (preliminary injunction 
against defendant includes order requiring the registries to change the registrar of record for the 
domain names to a registrar of plaintiff’s choosing); Chanel, Inc. v. P’nships & Unincorporated 
Ass’ns Identified on Schedule “A”, No. 2:11-CV-01508-KJD-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131456, 
at *10-11 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2011) (ordering domain name registers to “transfer to Plaintiff’s counsel, 
for deposit with this Court, domain name certificates” for the domain names at issue and ordering the 
top-level domain registries to “change the registrar of record for the [domain names]” and 
“immediately update the Domain Name System (“DNS”) data it maintains for the [domain names]” 
to resolve to a site at which a copy of the complaint was posted). 
 118.  See Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011); Protect IP Act, S. 968, 
112th Cong. § 103 (2011); see also S. REP. NO. 112-39, at 3-4 (2011). 
 119.  See Ex Parte Application for Order Extending for Sixty Days the Deadline for Filing 
Complaint for Forfeiture, No. 11-00110 (Sept. 8, 2011), https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/
threatlevel/2012/05/riaadeclaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX86-T8RW].  
 120.  In fact, it seems that the songs ICE alleged in its affidavit filed when it seized the domain 
name were sent by representatives of the copyright holder for the purpose of publicizing the works. 
See Mike Masnick, More & Bigger Mistakes Discovered in Homeland Security’s Domain Seizures, 
TECHDIRT (Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20101222/02112912376/more-bigger-
mistakes-discovered-homeland-securitys-domain-seizures.shtml [https://perma.cc/BHR4-WD37].  
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government seized a domain name on an ex parte basis, held it for a year 
by seeking ex parte extensions of time to file the forfeiture action it was 
required by statute to file in a timely fashion, and then essentially admitted 
there was no basis for the case. 
Even when not making mistakes (many of which could have been 
avoided with a little due process), the government has acted aggressively 
toward websites that are far from the core of copyright infringement. For 
example, ICE has seized domain names on the basis that the websites at 
the seized domain names linked to other sites that contained infringing 
material.121 Even in the civil context, courts generally have not considered 
mere linking to constitute direct copyright infringement.122 Under certain 
circumstances, linking could give rise to secondary liability.123 But 
making contributory copyright infringement criminal would be a 
significant departure from historical practice, and criminal conduct is 
necessary for the proper use of civil forfeiture statutes. By using civil 
forfeiture laws for that purpose, ICE has smuggled in a significant 
expansion of criminal liability under cover of enforcement against the 
“worst of the worst.”124 
Nor is this limited to copyright cases: ICE has seized the domain 
names of clothing resellers on the ground those sites were selling 
counterfeit products,125 without any apparent sensitivity to the fact that 
trademark law actually permits resale of branded goods in most 
circumstances.126 Here, too, ICE has worked a significant expansion of 
 121.  New York Investigators Seize 10 Websites that Illegally Streamed Copyrighted Sporting 
and Pay-Per-View Events, ICE NEWSROOM: U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1102/110202newyork.htm [https://perma.cc/87Y9-3ECP]. 
122.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 123.  See, e.g., Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2012) (suggesting that 
the defendant would be liable for contributory infringement if there was evidence that it invited users 
to link infringing videos on its website); Jane C. Ginsburg & Luke Ali Budiardjo, Liability for 
Providing Hyperlinks to Copyright-Infringing Content: International and Comparative Law 
Perspectives, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153, 196 (2018) (“Under the contributory liability doctrine, 
even the provision of a simple link could constitute an act of secondary infringement if that link 
encourages or assists an ultimate act of infringement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
124.  It’s not just ICE here—the government’s prosecution of MegaUpload was predicated on 
this same extension of criminal copyright provisions to conduct that typically would have been 
evaluated in terms of secondary liability as a civil matter. See Indictment, United States v. Dotcom, 
No. 1:12-3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.scribd.com/doc/78786408/Mega-Indictment 
[https://perma.cc/HHW3-KY8E]. In particular, the government’s theory relied heavily on extension 
of Grokster-style inducement liability as the basis for criminal prosecution. MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 125.  Jorge Espinosa, US Government Seizes 130 Domain, LEXNIMBUS (Nov. 26, 2011), 
http://lexnimbus.com/?p=196 [https://perma.cc/YHN6-A9TH].  
 126.  Champion Spark Plug v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947); Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 
359 (1924). 
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the scope of trademark law while pretending only to be enforcing the rules 
against those easily classified as rogue websites. 
Something very similar is going on with the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA).127 Originally designed to target computer hacking 
that implicates significant government interests of national security, 
financial records, and government property, Congress has repeatedly 
amended the statute to expand its reach. As Orin Kerr has documented, 
the cumulative effect has been to bring within the scope of CFAA the use 
of essentially any computer for any purpose.128 
These examples have something important in common: all of them 
involve legal tools originally justified on the ground they were necessary 
to combat the clearest and most serious violations. That limited purpose 
justified the draconian remedies these tools allow. Yet in practice it is 
clear that, like the Patriot Actwhich was passed on the ground that it 
was needed to combat terrorism but has been used overwhelmingly in 
ordinary drug cases129these tools are being used far beyond the contexts 
initially used to justify them. 
This calls into question not just the wisdom of these particular 
provisions (though it clearly does that), but of this form of regulation 
generally. In all of these contexts, policymakers tell us not to worry about 
the severity of the sanctions provided for, because those sanctions are 
narrowly tailored and will apply only in a small number of particularly 
egregious cases. Once those tools are available, however, it is too hard for 
the government to resist using them in a wider range of cases. Indeed, it 
may well be that doctrinal creep is inevitable. But the costs of that wider 
application are never accounted for when designing the rules, because the 
designers insist those applications will not come to pass. Given the 
frequency with which this pattern seems to recur, this is a major problem. 
If the costs of these tools are only justified to the extent they are applied 
very narrowly, and if we know it is unlikely they will, in fact, be applied 
narrowly, policymakers ought to be much more reluctant to create the 
tools at all. 
127.  18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).  
 128.  See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. 
L. REV. 1561 (2010); Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” 
in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003).  
129.  See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR 
DELAYED-NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS AND EXTENSIONS (July 2, 2009), 
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/SneakAndPeakReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3YD-J4QU] 
(reporting that 65% of uses of such warrants were in drug offense cases). 
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It is, of course, hardly a new observation that criminal law, and 
particularly federal criminal law, is vulnerable to doctrinal creep. Indeed, 
one might suggest that doctrinal creep is the defining feature of federal 
criminal law.130 Aside from the standard concerns about 
overcriminalization and the more specific concern about over-deterring 
potentially beneficial uses, in the IP context one important consequence 
of the expansion of criminal liability is that it shifts the burden of 
enforcement from private parties to the public.131 To the extent we believe 
the trademark system in particular is calibrated such that the costs of 
private enforcement counteract the law’s excesses,132 expansion of 
criminal liability undermines that calibration. That is a particularly serious 
problem to the extent criminal trademark law applies in cases of ordinary 
infringement rather than being limited to the truly egregious cases. 
Unfortunately, as we have seen, that may be happening more than we’d 
like to admit. 
130.  See, e.g., Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 884 
(2005) (“[F]ederal judges have been all too willing to construe federal crimes expansively . . . . The 
inevitable result of how courts approach their interpretive tasks is a broader and more punitive federal 
code.”). 
 131.  Cf. Yvette Joy Liebesman, Ex Parte Seizures Under the DTSA and the Shift of IP Rights 
Enforcement, 1 BUS. ENTREP. & TAX L. REV. 390, 393 (2017) (“Trademark and copyright owners 
have been successful in persuading Congress to legislatively expand and shift enforcement duties to 
governmental bodies and other entities regarding private intellectual property rights beyond 
customary importation authority.”). 
 132.  See, e.g., Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 661-
63 (2011). 
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